Towards a Philosophy of Engineering

Philosophy and Engineering: Setting the Stage, by Ibo van de Poel, in Philosophy and Engineering. An Emerging Agenda, Dorddrecht : Springer, 2010..

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1.2 Towards a Philosophy of Engineering

  

Since a philosophy of engineering is still to be developed, there is not a commonly agreed set of problems that define the field. Still, based on the workshop and earlier philosophical reflections on engineering, we can identify a number of topics that belong to the philosophy of engineering. Below, we sketch a number of such topics to give an impression of what a philosophy of engineering might look like, without the aim of being complete or exhaustive.

1.2.1 What is Engineering?

A first issue is how to define engineering, an issue that emerges in several contri-butions to this volume. All contributors agree that design is central to engineering (see e.g. the contributions by Davis, Luegenbiehl, Didier, Moses and the recent vol-ume Philosophy and Design edited by Vermaas, Kroes, Light and Moore). Beyond this, disagreement seems to rule. Durbin, for example, looks at engineering as guild, suggesting that engineering is not or at least not necessarily based on science and mathematics, whereas Luegenbiehl defines engineering as “the transformation of the natural world, using scientific principles and mathematics, in order to achieve some desired practical end” (Luegenbiehl, this volume, p. 153). As he notes, this definition “reflects the modern scientific foundation of engineering, rather than the crafts tradition” (Luegenbiehl, this volume, p. 153).

Li Bo-cong and Didier include other actors than just engineers in the engineering community like managers, other technologists, workers and investors. Davis, who wants to distinguish engineers from other technologists, would probably disagree: engineering is what engineers do in their capacity as engineers.

 In fact, the contributors do not agree on the best approach to defining engineer-ing. Luegenbiehl gives a stipulative definition (see above). Mitcham and Mackey in contrast propose a linguistic philosophical approach to characterising engineering:

what engineering is might be better determined by how the word “engineering” and its cog-nates and associated terms (such as invention, innovation, design, technology, science, etc.) are used, especially in relation to each other. From a linguistic philosophical perspective, it would be appropriate to begin not so much with our experiences of engineering but with the words we use to talk about such experiences (Mitcham and Mackey, this volume, p. 55).

Davis in his contribution criticizes both philosophical definitions of engineer-ing and a linguistic approach. With respect to the latter he remarks that “[t]he term ‘engineer’ (or ‘engineering’) is no guarantee that what is in question is an engineer (or engineering)” (Davis, this volume, p. 16). This is so because, for example, loco-motive engineers are not engineers in the sense we are interested in here. Moreover, in some languages, there are no clear distinctions between engineers and technolo-gists. With respect to philosophical definitions of engineering, Davis argues that

[a]ll attempts at philosophical definition will: a) be circular (that is, use “engineering” or a synonym or equally troublesome term); b) be open to serious counter-examples (whether because they exclude from engineering activities clearly belonging or because they include activities clearly not belonging); c) be too abstract to be informative; or d) suffer a combi-nation of these errors (Davis, this volume, p. 17).

As an alternative he proposes a historical approach:

engineering, like other professions, is self-defining (in something other than the classical sense of definition). There is a core, more or less fixed by history at any given time, which determines what is engineering and what is not. This historical core, a set of living practi-tioners who—by discipline, occupation, and profession—undoubtedly are engineers, con-stitutes the profession (Davis, this volume, p. 16).

In relation to ethical reflection, a major issue is, as noted by Luegenbiel, whether a definition of engineering should “emphasize the requirement of engineering activ-ity to benefit humanity” (Luegenbiehl, this volume, p. 153) or should choose a more value-neutral approach. The first approach is prominent in traditional engineering ethics where engineering is conceived of as a profession (see e.g. Davis 1998) and it also seems at work in the contributions by Gunn and Bowen. Luegenbiehl and Didier in their contributions prefer a more value-neutral approach. Luegenbiehl does so because he is interested in global cross-cultural ethical principles for engi-neering, and a more value-neutral approach to defining engineering “avoids having to deal initially with the questions of culturally based ideas of benefit and harm.” (Luegenbiehl, this volume, p. 153) Nevertheless, he believes that “some value ele-ment is unavoidable, in that I assume that engineering activity should leave the world no less well off and that disbenefits created by engineering not be catastrophic in nature.” (Luegenbiehl, this volume, p. 153)

According to Didier, engineering has in history had both morally positive and negative (and value-free) connotations. She prefers to conceive of engineering not as a profession that by definition makes a positive contribution to society but rather as an activity that can be ethically evaluated. Didier’s proposal has the advantage

1   Philosophy and Engineering: Setting the Stage

5

of not assuming a culturally-bound notion of profession. (As she argues the Anglo-Saxon notion of profession does not have a clear counterpart in France.) Moreover, her neutral definition opens the ways to ethical reflection on engineering activities like design (see the contribution by Robison and see Van de Poel 2001) and innovation (see the contribution by De Kreuk et al.) that are somewhat neglected in traditional engineering ethics. It might also broaden the discussion about the respon-sibilities of engineers beyond what is stated in codes of ethics for engineering (see e.g. the contributions by Coeckelbergh and by Pols).

1.2.2 The Relation Between Science, Technology and Engineering

An issue that is related to the definition of engineering is how to understand and characterize the relation between science, technology and engineering. This issue surfaces in several contributions to his volume. Despite differences, there is at least one point of agreement: engineering is not applied science. Pitt looks at the real-world interaction between science and engineering and suggests that science may depend on engineering rather than the reverse. Moses argues that design differenti-ates engineering from science and mathematics. Broome suggests that engineering employs a different (formal) language game than science and mathematics, one in which there is room to express error and incertitude.

Li Bo-cong argues for what he calls the trichotomy of science, technology and engineering: science, technology and engineering are three distinct though related activities. According to him, the core activity of science is discovery, of technology invention and of engineering making. Science produces scientific knowledge like theories; technology produces technological knowledge, like patents and blueprints for an invention and engineering produces the actual material products. Two things are worth noting about Bo-cong’s account in relation to other possible accounts of the relation between science, technology and engineering. First, what he calls technology, some others would call engineering science (as distinct from natural science). Aspects of engineering science, and differences with natural science, are discussed in the contributions by De Vries and Pirtle. Second, Bo-cong conceives of technology as an activity, rather than as the product or object of engineering.² In his book Thinking Through Technology, Mitcham describes two other common con-ceptualisations of technology, in addition to technology as object and technology as activity, i.e. technology as knowledge and as volition (wilful or purposive action). Each of these conceptualisations of technology foregrounds different philosophi-cal questions and each would probably account for a somewhat different relation between technology and engineering and, hence, between the philosophy of tech-nology and the philosophy of engineering.

                                                                                                    

1.2.3 Other Philosophical Issues in Engineering

The issues discussed above are largely conceptual: how to best define and under-stand engineering, technology, and science and how to understand their relation? Such conceptual questions may also be asked about specific activities and con-cepts in engineering like design, function, invention, creativity and patents. For example, Vermaas in his contributions sets out the ICE-theory that tries to solve a number of conceptual (and metaphysical) issues with respect to technical functions. In addition to conceptual issues, engineering raises a range of other philosophical questions.

One additional kind of issue is epistemological: what is the nature of engineering knowledge and the justification of such knowledge? The seminal work here is still

What engineers know and how they know it by Walter Vincenti – an engineer and historian of technology. Vincenti distinguishes different types of engineering knowl-edge. (For a recent discussion of epistemological issues see Houkes 2006.) The contributions by the philosophers De Vries and Pirtle in this volume also address epistemological issues.

Another kind of issue is methodological, i.e. questions about the methods employed in engineering and their adequacy and justification. The engineer Billy Koen has argued in his book Discussion of the Method that all methods in engineer-ing are fundamentally heuristic in nature (see also his contribution to this volume). Philosophers have critically examined a number of methods used in engineering like multi-criteria decision-making (Franssen 2005), design methods (Vermaas and Dorst 2006) and quality function deployment (Van de Poel 2007). In this volume, one of the pioneers of systems engineering, Joel Moses, discusses different approaches in systems engineering. The philosopher Ottens provides a critical analysis of methods in systems engineering for the design and management of socio-technical systems. Engineer Abbott discusses a number of issues in software development.

Engineering also raises metaphysical and ontological issues, for example, about the status of design or functions. It might seem that such issues are less rele-vant to practising engineers than, for example, conceptual, epistemological and methodological issues. Vermaas in his contribution, for example, suggests that the ICE-theory for technological functions that he and Houkes developed needs to be stripped off from its philosophical assumptions to make it relevant to engineer-ing. Despite Vermaas’ scepticism, engineers have engaged in applied ontology as a means for developing (better) design methods, databases of engineering parts and the like (e.g. Kitamura et al. 2006).

Engineering obviously also raises ethical issues, as is witnessed by the devel-opment of engineering ethics. As argued above, some authors in this volume fur-ther extend the scope of engineering ethics. Again, this is an area to which both philosophers and engineers have made a contribution. Typically, the main textbooks in engineering ethics are written by a combination of philosophers and engineers (Vesilind and Gunn 1998; Martin and Schinzinger 2005; Harris et al. 2008).

Engineering does not only raise new philosophical problems, it might also some-times shed new light on existing philosophical questions. McCarthy in her contri-bution suggests that an examination of engineering knowledge would create new insights into existing epistemological questions. With respect to ethics, it might be argued that engineers in the design process deal with conflicting values by creatively thinking of new designs and innovations that soften or even solve existing value con-flicts (Van de Poel 2005). This is a way of dealing with value conflicts that has been overlooked in the philosophical literature on value conflict. The later, indeed, sug-gests another important theme for philosophical reflection in engineering: creativity and innovation.

 

The above list of issues may be a bit biased towards an analytical approach to the philosophy of engineering. As the contributions by Durbin and by Mitcham and Mackay illustrate other approaches are possible as well.

1.2.4    Interaction and Cooperation Between Philosophers and Engineers

The above overview shows that both engineers and philosophers have been and are working on conceptual, epistemological, methodological, ontological and ethical issues in engineering. This is not to say that they have always done so in cooper-ation or that they always agree on the quality standards for such work. Above, we have suggested that they do not necessarily do so, and this is in fact underlined by the experiences described by Vermaas in his paper. Still, this volume also shows examples of good cooperation between engineers and philosophers, for example in dealing with ethical issues in innovation (De Kreuk et al.) and in developing teach-ing materials for engineering ethics (Kroesen and van der Zwaag). Typically, the main examples of fruitful cooperation between engineers and philosophers are from ethics.

One might wonder what would be required for a further fruitful cooperation between philosophers and engineers. As earlier noticed, philosophers and engineers come from different (academic) cultures. Cooperation then seems to require some changes in the mind-set of both disciplines. For philosophers, it requires at least the willingness to pay attention to the reality of engineering practice; the empirical turn in the philosophy suggests that at least some philosophers are now making this move. For engineers, it would require a willingness to reflect on their own practices even if this is not immediately useful or even undermines current practices. (This is not to say that philosophical reflection cannot be useful for engineering eventu-ally, but one should not expect immediate results.) Goldberg in his contribution to this volume suggests that engineering is now increasingly facing a global crisis that spurs, at least temporarily, a turn to philosophy.

The further cooperation between philosophers and engineers, and more generally the philosophical reflection on engineering, will be facilitated by the continuation of the WPE workshops.